Strategic Social Choice
Stable Representations of Constitutions
(Sprache: Englisch)
Strategic Social Choice provides the first monograph devoted to the modeling of constitutions with effectivity functions. Written for researchers and students in the field, this volume focuses on social choice functions that admit strong Nash equilibrium.
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Produktinformationen zu „Strategic Social Choice “
Strategic Social Choice provides the first monograph devoted to the modeling of constitutions with effectivity functions. Written for researchers and students in the field, this volume focuses on social choice functions that admit strong Nash equilibrium.
Klappentext zu „Strategic Social Choice “
This book was written mainly during the Spring periods of 2008 and 2009, when the ?rst author was visiting Maastricht University. Financial s- port both from the Dutch Science Foundation NWO (grants 040. 11. 013 and 0. 40. 11. 082) and from the research institute METEOR (Maastricht Univ- sity) is gratefully acknowledged. Jerusalem Bezalel Peleg Maastricht Hans Peters April 2010 v Contents Preview to this book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Part I Representations of constitutions 1 Introduction to Part I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 2 Arrow's constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 3 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and its implications. . . . . . . . . 4 1. 4 Ga ¨rdenfors's model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. 5 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 Constitutions, e?ectivity functions, and game forms . . . . . . 7 2. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. 2 Constitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. 3 Constitutions and e?ectivity functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2. 4 Game forms and a representation theorem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2. 5 Representation and simultaneous exercising of rights. . . . . . . . 19 2. 6 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3 Nash consistent representations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 21 3. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. 2 Existence of Nash consistent representations: a general result 22 3. 3 The case of ?nitely many
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alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3. 4 Nash consistent representations of topological e?ectivity functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3. 5 Veto functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. 5. 1 Finitely many alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. 5. 2 Topological veto functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3. 6 Liberalism and Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria. . . . . . . . . 40 3. 7 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 vii viii Contents 4 Acceptable representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Inhaltsverzeichnis zu „Strategic Social Choice “
Preview of this book.- Representations of constitutions: Introduction to Part I; Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms; Nash consistent representations; Acceptable representations; Strongly consistent representations; Nash consistent representation through lottery models; On the continuity of representations of constitutions.- Consistent voting: Introduction to Part II; Feasible elimination procedures; Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions; Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.
Autoren-Porträt von Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
Hans Peters ist Klinischer Psychologe, Sonder- und Heilpädagoge und war über 30 Jahre in einer großen Einrichtung für geistig behinderte Menschen tätig, zuletzt als Leiter der Abteilung Intensivbehandlung. Er arbeitet als Supervisor und Lehrtherapeut in der Niederländischen Vereinigung für Verhaltenstherapie sowie in der Flämischen Vereinigung für Klientenzentrierte Psychotherapie.Bibliographische Angaben
- Autoren: Bezalel Peleg , Hans Peters
- 2012, Repr. d. Ausg. v. 2010, XVIII, 154 Seiten, Maße: 17,3 x 23,6 cm, Kartoniert (TB), Englisch
- Verlag: Springer, Berlin
- ISBN-10: 3642265057
- ISBN-13: 9783642265051
Sprache:
Englisch
Pressezitat
From the reviews:"The book studies stable representations of constitutions. ... the book is very well written and perfectly organized ... . I can highly recommend the book by Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: a real pleasure for scholars working on effectivity functions and social choice functions, and a great learning opportunity for those who are not that familiar with the topics in question. It is an excellent contribution, bringing together a lot of material in a single manuscript in a coherent way." (Agnieszka Rusinowska, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 40, 2013)"The book presents in terms of effectivity functions (i.e. coalitional game forms) a very deep, clear and consistent exposition of the most important social choice problem-coalitional decision making. ... Written by two authors who have made outstanding contributions to the developed theory, the book will be very useful for game and social choice experts, lecturers, and master's and Ph.D. students in these fields." (Fouad T. Aleskerov, Mathematical Reviews, Issue 2012 b)
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