The failure of US intelligence in Iraq (PDF)

Essay aus dem Jahr 2008 im Fachbereich Politik - Internationale Politik - Region: Naher Osten, Vorderer Orient, Macquarie University, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: United States (US) intelligence efforts are massive by any standards. More than 20.000 employees work for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), another 21.000 for the National Security Agency (NSA) and another 8500 for the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). In 2004, the US government invested more than US$ 35 billion into intelligence and additionally numerous analysts work on intelligence in other governmental agencies with an associated intelligence function as well as in non-governmental institutions. Therefore, one might say that the US intelligence community (IC) is one of the most professionalized and effective intelligence frameworks worldwide. Hence, it is not surprisingly that reams of successes were achieved, even though many of them will remain unknown since the IC will keep operations and methods classified. Yet, despite outstanding financial and human resources, the IC produced many serious intelligence failures. Beginning with the German attack on the Soviet Union and Pear Harbour in 1941 until the failure to foresee the devastating terrorist acts of 9/11 failures are an element of intelligence work in the United States. However, one of the most serious failure of intelligence has been the preparation to the coalition led invasion in Iraq in 2003. The US intelligence community faces severe criticism and accusations of intended wrong information on the case of Iraq. However, in the following this paper will argue that the failure of intelligence resulted from a combination of bureaucratic obscurities and political intended production of customized intelligence. Furthermore, the reliance on doubtful information and the demotion of traditional intelligence processes led to the failure of intelligence in the advance of the Iraq war.