

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This monograph on Europe and SALT during the era Nixon-Ford is the product of a wider research project of the author on 'Nuclear Order 1968–1980s'. The research focus of the author has shifted from transatlantic defense relations to global and regional nuclear order in 2011. A first manifestation of this new research focus was a panel on '*Nuclear Diplomacy – Nuclear Defense*' at the Alexandria Hilton SHAFR Conference 2011. The papers have been published in *Historische Mitteilungen* as a 'Themenschwerpunkt'. The core focus of the wider project is on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The latter also forms the platform for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Art VI NPT imposed on the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) the obligation to seek 'in good faith' a limitation and reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals. The theme of the present volume, SALT and Europe, naturally emerges out of the NATO deliberations on nuclear sharing, the European Nuclear Option and the nuclear disarmament obligation of the NPT. The monograph '*Equal Security*' looks at the compatibility of the strategic arms control of the superpowers with European *détente* and European unity. This volume thus does not recount the classic US narrative of the SALT process but focuses almost exclusively on the impact of SALT on NATO and the European Communities. SALT forced NATO Europe to organize in order to have a voice opportunity. NATO Europe thus was able to defend European security interests and to shape or structure the US SALT negotiation position. The focus thus is on the compatibility of the institutionalization of bipolarity and Western regional security. What was to be prioritized: systemic stability or Alliance solidarity? The narrative outlines the constant struggle of priorities, the clash of regional and national interests, the fight for equal security: the security of the Soviet Union and the United States, but also the security of NATO Europe. The difficult adjustment processes to the emerging new superpower framework with its repercussions on European Security, Atlantic solidarity and European Unity are described and analyzed on the basis of recently declassified European archival resources and the wide array of recently edited archival resources from both sides of the Atlantic. The outcome is a study that rebalances our understanding of the SALT process and of European unity. The present study offers a perfect platform for an understanding of Europe's role in global and regional arms control and of the Euro Missile Crisis of the 1980s. The present volume is the first of two volumes on Europe and the SALT process. The second volume – SALT II and Europe during the era Carter 1976–1979 – is scheduled for publication in 2015. Both volumes will be of major interest for scholars from various fields in Contemporary History, International History and International Politics.

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I. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A BIPOLAR WORLD ORDER? SALT I & EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1969–1972

‘The summit agreements began the establishment of a pattern of inter-relationships and co-operation in a number of different areas. This was the first stage of *détente*: to involve Soviet interests in ways that would increase their stake in international stability and the *status quo*.’¹
Richard Nixon

1. INTRODUCTION

The system configuration of the world during the Cold War was bipolarity. Bipolar orders are deemed stable in International Relations theory. The Cold War, however, led to constant frictions and confrontations. Marc Trachtenberg² offers a clear and convincing explanation for the instability. The superpower control of the globe was not complete. The SU and the United States (US) had filled the vacuum that had emerged in Europe after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Spheres of influences were established in line with Stalin’s predictions. The armies of the US and of the SU would export their social systems. Wherever the Red Army would be in control, communism would prevail. Whatever territory the US Army would ‘liberate’ would be integrated in the US orbit of capitalist market economies and Western democracy. One area, however, remained contested: Germany. Germany was occupied by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The Allied Powers had a common obligation to administer the territory of the former enemy. Frictions were the result. Thus the unsolved German question was responsible for the instability of the Cold War – up to the Cold War settlement of the German question in the shadow of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This important interpretation remains contested. Another facet deserves attention: the factor Europe. A third tectonic plate existed during the Cold War: The ‘Old Continent’ in its institutionalized form. The United Kingdom (UK) as the third victorious party emerging from World War II originally had embarked on the formation of a European power bloc. The Western Union concept, however, failed due to the ever growing East West tensions. But the European nucleus survived as a subsys-

- 1 Richard Nixon, cit in C.L. Sulzberger, *The World of Richard Nixon*, New York: Prentice Hall Press 1987, 196.
- 2 Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace. The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963*, Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press 1999.

tem in the Western partial order. The process of European unity of the ‘Six’ and of the ‘Seven’ was a process to obtain autonomy in common as an independent entity or ‘billiard ball’ in the international system. Europe aimed at multi-polarity and thus contested the structures of the Cold War, the division of Europe and the specter of a superpower ‘condominium’. A condominium perpetuated the division of the Continent and the subordination of Europe to an institutionalized bipolarity. Thus the instability was due to a revisionist Germany and a revisionist Europe. Both intended to limit the parallel ‘hegemonies’ of the superpowers in order to regain an independent position in world affairs. The final outcome of the contest had to have systemic implications: a change from bi- to multi-polarity.³

This study deals with the core ‘battle’: the institutionalization of bipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. With the Partial or Limited Test Ban Treaty (PTBT/LTBT) of 1963 the superpowers had started to cooperate to preserve a stable – bipolar – world order. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was the breakthrough for superpower *détente*. The NPT was a blocking treaty, a static treaty, that aimed at the preservation of the *status quo*. The NPT aimed at the preservation of the system configuration of bipolarity: the common interest of the superpowers.⁴ The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) – which emerged out of Article VI of the NPT – offered the superpowers an option to create a condominium.⁵ The superpowers could extend the non-transfer clause of the NPT to nuclear delivery systems thus undermining the ‘European Option’ for a European deterrent preserved by the NPT. The superpower *détente*, however, was challenged by Europe. The Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) had embraced the NPT due to Article VI.

- 3 ‘By establishing more definitely the existing line of division in Europe, the Soviet Union would generally stabilize its European position. [...] a further more specific objective of the Soviet European policy will be to protect its own interests which may be threatened by the movement for a united Europe. An enlarged and successful Community would present numerous real disadvantages to the Soviet Union. [...] The European development which causes the Soviet Government even more concern is the possibility that a separate European nuclear force may emerge [...]. It is of course possible that in the longer term the Soviet Union might take a different view at the whole European question. It would in theory be possible for the USSR to welcome the creation of a genuinely independent Europe, since this would pave the way for the ultimate separation of North America from the European states [...].’ Sir D. Wilson (Moscow)-Mr. Stewart, 14 Jul 1969, DBPO, Series 3, volume 1: Britain and Soviet Union, 1968–1972, No 36, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dbpo-us:&rft_dat=xri:dbpo:rec:DBPO040910046 (access date: 15 March 2011).
- 4 ‘Sperrverträge [...] sind ihrer Natur nach statisch. Sie begünstigen das Bestehende [...]’, Dr. Schippenkötter, Fragen der Abrüstung, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 July 1969, *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes*, Berlin (PA-AA), B 21, 743, 22.
- 5 Dr Ruete, Probleme der Ostpolitik und der europäischen Sicherheit, Botschafterkonferenz Westeuropa, 30. Juni–2. Juli 1969, 9 Jul 1969, PA-AA, B 21, 743, 5f; Michael Meimeth, *Frankreichs Entspannungspolitik der 70er Jahre: Zwischen Status Quo und friedlichem Wandel. Die Ära Georges Pompidou und Valéry Giscard d’Estaing*, Baden-Baden: NOMOS, 1990, 17.

The latter demanded that the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) would work towards general disarmament and not a mere freeze of the *status quo* by way of arms control. Disarmament, i.e. arms reductions, meant a relative gain for Europe's position in the international system. European deterrence *per se* aimed not at stabilizing bipolarity, but at overcoming bipolarity. The focus of the West-Europeans was on universal principles on the one hand and regional action on the other. The West-Europeans focused on contacts beyond the 'Iron Curtain' in order to create an all-European entity and to undermine in common the bipolarity of the superpower structure. Thus European and superpower *détente* were not necessarily compatible. For Europeans there was no possibility of a settlement of the German question in bipolarity. 'Finlandization' was not an option. A policy of neutralization or neutrality would have discriminated Germany and destroyed 'Europe' as a player on the global scale. There was only one avenue worth pursuing: the unification of Germany in a unified Europe. The West-German *Ostpolitik*, the European *détente*, threatened the institutionalization of a bipolar order by drawing Poland, Romania and other Warsaw Pact states closer into the European circle. Simultaneously European *détente* would challenge US leadership if both remained uncoordinated. A failure to harmonize European security interests with the national security interests of the US would have undermined Western solidarity and strength. The Harmel Report sought a remedy: it enhanced NATO's role in collective security beyond defense and deterrence to *détente*. European voice opportunity was the outcome. The US was obliged to consult NATO in East-West affairs.⁶ Alliance interests mattered: only a common approach to the SU guaranteed Western solidarity and bloc stability.

Two battle lines are thus discernible: (1) the struggle for a safe and stable world order among the superpowers and (2) the intra-Alliance struggle on a vision for the future of Europe. Which of the 'games' was to be prioritized? Was global and European security compatible? In case the US prioritized her national security interests over European security the 'Alliance' threatened to disintegrate. In case the US prioritized global security Europe's security was endangered – yet again. This monograph on Europe and the SALT process in the Era Nixon-Ford deals with the impact of the institutionalization of the global nuclear order on European security. This book does not deal with the fight for a 'European Option' during the NPT negotiations⁷, but will focus on the impact of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of 1969–1976 on European security and the European Nuclear Option. What did SALT mean for Europe?⁸ What was the impact of SALT on Europe? Did SALT threaten to undermine or bolster European security and autonomy?

6 Ruete an alle diplomatischen Vertretungen. Betr. Europäische Sicherheit, 26 Mar 1968, PA-AA, ZW 107296.

7 Ralph Dietl, 'European Decision Making? The US, Nuclear Non Proliferation and the European Option 1967–1972', *Historische Mitteilungen* 24 (2011), 43–89.

8 Andrew Pierre, 'Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America', *Foreign Affairs*, 49 (1970–71), 283–301, 285.

What were the consequences for the European NWS and the European NNWS, and what were the consequences for Europe's place in the global nuclear order? The narrative will not focus on the US-Soviet SALT negotiations in Helsinki and Vienna or on the domestic decision-making on SALT in either the US or the Soviet Union. The diplomatic record of the negotiations is well captured in the excellent studies of Raymond Garthoff⁹, Gerard Smith¹⁰, Henry Kissinger¹¹, John Newhouse¹², Morton A. Kaplan¹³ and Mason Willrich & John Rhinelander¹⁴ for the SALT I process. The early SALT II process left fewer traces in the literature. This is highlighted by Garthoff in *Détente and Confrontation*. Strobe Talbott is the Master of the Game on SALT II.¹⁵ Thomas Wolfe's RAND study offers further valuable insights.¹⁶ The Congressional Hearings uncover the domestic debate. Wanting are studies on the intra-Alliance debate, the US-UK bilateral SALT negotiations and 'Europe's' influence on and response to the SALT negotiations. This book offers the indispensable pre-history to the SALT II Treaty of 1979 and the emerging SALT III or START process; this book is a valuable addition to the literature on the Euro Missile Crisis, since it uncovers the European agenda in the formative period of strategic arms control. The fight about Intermediate-Range Ballistic/Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (IR/MRBM) starts in 1970 – not during the Carter Administration. To comprehend European security during the Euro Missile Crisis and the role of arms control for the future of Europe, to comprehend the revival of the Western European Union and of European Arms cooperation in the 1980s it is indispensable to analyze the role of SALT I and the early SALT II process for both the European and the global nuclear order.

This monograph is not a history of the SALT process. This is a study on the impact of nuclear arms control during SALT I and the early SALT II process on Euro-Atlantic relations. This is a study on shifts in the international system. It deals with a growing poly-centricity in the international relations of the 1970s, and a danger of dissolution of the Atlantic alliance. It thus deals with the challenge to connect political multi-polarity with the strategic bipolarity of the era.¹⁷ The

- 9 Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1994.
- 10 Gerard Smith, *Double Talk*. The Story of SALT, Lanham: University of America Press 1985.
- 11 Henry Kissinger, *Memoiren*, Band I, 1968–1973, Güthersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1979.
- 12 John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*. The Story of SALT, New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston 1973.
- 13 Morton A. Kaplan (ed), *SALT: Problems and Perspectives*, Morristown N.J: General Learning Press 1973.
- 14 Mason Willrich/John B. Rhinelander (eds), *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond*, London: The Free Press 1974.
- 15 Strobe Talbott, *Endgame*. The Inside Story of SALT II, New York: Harper & Row 1979; Id, *The Master of the Game*. Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace, New York: Vintage Book 1988.
- 16 Thomas Wolfe, *The SALT Experience*, Cambridge/MA: Ballinger Publishers 1979.
- 17 Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine*. America's Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984.

growing parity between the superpowers undermined the 'bloc' architecture. Parity threatened to disaggregate the 'West' into two strategic theatres. The Atlantic bridge threatened to collapse due to (1) a growing 'neo-isolationism' in the US, that manifested itself in the demand for unilateral force reductions, and due to (2) an enlarging Europe with global interests and enhanced means. The preservation and modernization of long-range theatre nuclear weapons and nuclear strike forces mattered for NATO unity and European defense. SALT and the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks – that dealt with European theatre force reductions – touched on forward based systems (FBS). FBS are US systems stationed abroad with a capability to strike the SU proper. Any decision by the superpowers to remove US FBS from the European theatre would have had major repercussion on Atlantic unity, European integration, and the international system at large. US disengagement as a result of a US-SU arms control agreement would have demanded a rebalancing of the Western partial system, a 'Europeanization' of NATO or the use of the 'European Option' by the member states of the European Communities. Strategic arms control sets the framework. It freezes the relative position of any given player in the international system and within any partial orders – to utilize a phrase utilized by Volker Rittberger.

The SALT process 'institutionalized' systemic bipolarity and threatened to relegate the 'pentagonal structure' of the NPT to a secondary position in a 'multi-hierarchical system' dominated in various degrees by the NWS.¹⁸ Nuclear defense questions thus followed a complex logic synthesizing mere survival with a status bias in a relative gains world. The relative position in the international system mattered – irrespective of regime formations. This study thus goes beyond Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin in its 'critique' of arms control theory. Arms control was an important facet of normal politico-military relations. It followed the rules of international relations.¹⁹ Arms control is not beyond power politics but follows the logic of power politics. There is no contradiction between military strategy and strategic co-operation.²⁰ Arms control is power-based regime formation.²¹ Arms control seeks long term survival thru stability and predictability – at

18 Richard A Falk, 'Arms Control, Foreign Policy, and Global Reform', *Daedalus* 104,3 (1974), 35–49; Heinrich Buch, 'Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei SALT – Mitspieler oder Zuschauer', in Helga Haftendorn/Wolf-Dieter Karl/Joachim Krause/Lothar Wilker (eds), *Verwaltete Außenpolitik. Sicherheits- und entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bonn*, Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1978, 115–134, 119.

19 Thomas Schelling/Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1961, 4ff.

20 Thomas C. Schelling, 'The Thirtieth Year', *Daedalus* 120,1 (1991), 21–32, 23; F.A. Long, 'Arms Control From the Perspective of the Nineteen-Seventies', *Daedalus*, 104,3 (1975), 1–13, 1f.

21 Harald Müller/Niklas Schörning, *Rüstungsdynamik und Rüstungskontrolle. Eine exemplarische Einführung in die Internationalen Beziehungen*, Baden-Baden: NOMOS 2006, 123.

its best and domination at its worst.²² It is a tool to be employed strategically to foster an environment in line with the core interests of the players involved. It serves a relative gains calculus. The logic of survival, security and domination applies. The Clausewitzian world remains untouched. Strategic arms control is the grand game of power politics.

It is worth quoting in this context Schelling and Halperin:

‘Arms control can [...] strengthen Alliances, collapse them, or make them unnecessary. It can create confidence and trust or can create suspicion and irritation. It can lead to greater world organization and the rule of law or discredit them. And it evidently lends itself to short term competition in propaganda.’²³

This book focuses on the first game – the Alliance game. It looks at Alliance cohesion and world order. It looks at Europe’s response to and impact on the nuclear arms control policy of the Nixon-Ford Administration. President Richard Nixon in 1973 outlined ‘five’ objectives for the US-SU bilateral arms control. The fifth objective was to keep the security of ‘third parties undiminished.’²⁴ The other objectives were the establishment of ‘essential equivalence’ between the superpowers; the maintenance of survivability of strategic forces; a modernization option that preserved strategic stability and verifiability. The four latter categories all had a major impact on the security of the European Allies. Essential equivalence or parity among the superpowers questioned the US nuclear guarantee; the survivability of US strategic forces had a direct impact on NATO strike force composition and development; the modernization question automatically involved transfer questions. Even verifiability mattered for European security.²⁵

European security was always affected. Europe’s relative position in the international system depended on the outcome of the SALT process. All of the listed ‘objectives’ mattered for NATO’s future role in Western defense, for Europe’s place in the world, and Europe’s security and survival. ‘Equal security’ should not be limited to the superpowers. Optimal outcomes mattered for European states as much as for the superpowers. This book focuses on the intra-Alliance dimension of the bilateral Strategic Arms Control Talks. It focuses on mechanisms, caucuses and fora utilized by Allies (1) to defend European theatre positions, (2) to impact on the negotiation packages, and (3) to respond in common to challenges to European interests. The NATO SALT Experts meetings, the European SALT Experts meetings, and the bilateral Anglo-American SAL Talks in Washington DC form the bone structure for an analysis of the European share in the SALT I and SALT II processes. Both the European SALT Experts meetings and the Anglo-American SAL Talks were kept secret. The heads of the Disarma-

22 Colin S. Gray, *The House of Cards. Why Arms Control Must Fail*, Ithaca/NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, 8f.

23 Schelling/Halperin, 6.

24 Falk, 36.

25 Ibid, 36f; Stanley R. Sloan/Robert C. Gray, ‘Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control. Challenges for US Foreign Policy’, *Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series*, No 261.

ment Departments of the Foreign Ministries gathered for the European SALT Experts meetings. The Anglo-American SAL talks involved staff of the UK Embassy in Washington and representatives from the Whitehall bureaucracy. Ministerial representation was omitted in order not to attract media attention. Thus the public was not informed about the consultation structures within the Atlantic framework. Even Allied governments were kept in the dark about the SALT network. A look at the main 'theatre' – the 'back channel' negotiations of Dr Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin – further underlines the secretive nature of SALT decision-making. Parts of the deliberations were unknown to the US SALT Delegation, to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the State Department – withstanding the elaborate US SALT machinery in Washington DC dominated by the National Security Advisor (NSA): Dr Kissinger.²⁶ The Russian structures of decision-making for the SALT process were largely unknown outside of the SU and were first described in Aleksandr Savel'yev/Nikolay Detinov 'The Big Five'.²⁷ The SALT diplomatic process thus is to be distinguished from the 'domestic' game of public diplomacy and coalition formation beyond the core bureaucracies. The SALT Hearings – the domestic US debate, the public lobbying of interest groups, the information warfare within the Washington beltway and beyond on Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) and SALT – are not the focus of this study. The study focuses entirely on the diplomatic front, on intra-Alliance negotiations, and official 'European' channels to impact on the SALT process. This is reflected in the source base for the present study in classic diplomacy, strategy and arms control during the Nixon-Ford era.

Any arms control measures of a 'technical' importance: technical measures to forestall accidental war, technical definitions, verification questions and mechanisms for crisis consultation or confidence building measures are not part of the narrative. These are by and large 'apolitical' measures dealing with crisis stability. They serve no 'specific' political purpose. All these aspects of arms control are not – or rarely – impacting on the division of power in the international system. Aspects thereof feature only in case they impact on the 'geopolitics' of arms control, i.e. the nuclear world or regional order.

The monograph is divided into two main parts: Part I deals with the SALT I process and ends with the Moscow Summit Agreement of May 1972. Part II analyses the early SALT II process centered on the Vladivostok Accord of 1974. The study ends with the inconclusive debates on cruise missiles (CM), the 'backfire bomber' and European security. Offered is a history of Western Europe's role in

26 Buch, 130; Lawrence Weiler, 'Secrecy in Arms Control Negotiations', in Id/Alan Platt (eds), *Congress and Arms Control*, Boulder/CO: Westview 1978, 157–183.

27 Aleksandr G. Savel'yev/Nikolay N Detinov, *The Big Five. Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union*, Westport/CN: Praeger 1995.

strategic arms control prior to the Carter Administration. Offered is a prehistory to the European security dimension of SALT II, the Euro missile crisis, and the dual track decision of NATO.