The State and the International Oil Market

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Chapter 2 REDRAWING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN STATE AND COMPANY . . . 3 Chapter 3 STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Chapter 4 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Chapter 5 THE FAILURE OF OPEC TO SECURE ECONOMIC RENTS . . . . . . . . . . 67 Chapter 6 TURNING BLACK GOLD INTO DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Chapter 7 NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Chapter 8 AMBITIOUS CONSOLIDATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Chapter 9 STRATEGIC CONSOLIDATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 PREFACE This book has been kicking around my desk for quite some time. On and off I returned to my work on the role of the state in the economy and the international oil market, but for a long time I was not satisfied with the shape it was in. I understand now that I needed the insights developed over the past couple of years on the role of the state, regulation, liberalization, privatization, and the recent events in the international oil industry to bring all my ideas together in a more coherent format. It was the events that followed the Asian financial crisis that drew me back to finish writing this book. The early beginnings of this book were developed atthe Institute of International Affairs, Chatham I-louse, in London, where I was a research fellow with the Energy and Environment Programme in 1992 and 1993. At the Colorado School of Mines, I had the